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Case No. 20100938

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DONNA WHITNEY, individually and as parent and heir of Dillon
Whitney, deceased,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICES and
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendants/Appellants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF ON CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Defendants, the Utah Department of Human Services and the
Utah Division of Juvenile Justice Services, submit their brief on a
certified question of state law.

Jurisdictional Statement
The United States District Court for the Tenth Circuit certified a
single question of state law that this Court accepted. The Court
possesses original jurisdiction to answer that question under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102Q) (West 2009).

Question Presented
Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor
home incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, such that Utah has
not waived its state sovereign immunity for injuries arising out of, in
connection with, or resulting from his placement, pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7301(5)(j)?
Standard of Review
When a federal court certifies a question of state law, this Court
answers "the legal question[ ] presented without resolving the
underlying dispute." In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,1 6, 99 P.3d 793.

-2-

Determinative Statutory Provision
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's incarceration exception
states:
(5) Immunity from suit of each
governmental entity is not waived under
Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of,
in connection with, or results from

(j) the incarceration of any person in any
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of
legal confinement [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (West Supp. 2009).

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case.
This case stems from the tragic death of Dillon Whitney, who for
nearly a year before his death had been committed to custody of Utah's
Department of Human Services (DHS), Division of Juvenile Justice
Services (DJJS) for appropriate out-of-home placement. Dillon became

-3-

injured and died when he fell down a flight of stairs while AWOL from
his court-ordered proctor placement. Plaintiff sued DHS, DJJS, and
others, claiming in part that the State negligently approved and
supervised Dillon's placement. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
governs the viability of that claim. Because Plaintiffs alleged injury
arose out of, and is factually connected to Dillon Whitney's
incarceration in a place a legal confinement, Defendants retain
immunity from Plaintiffs negligence suit. Relying chiefly on the Youth
Corrections Act and inapposite law, a federal district court judge
determined that because at the time of his death, Dillon Whitney
resided in a non-secure "community-based program," he was not then
incarcerated and, Defendants were, accordingly, not immune.
Defendants ask the Court to reject that interpretation of Utah law.
Procedural History and Disposition in Federal Court.
Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged
substantive due process violation and under Utah law for various acts of
negligence and for wrongful death. Aplt. App. 15-42, Doc. 2, Amd.
Compl. Defendants removed the matter to federal court and filed a
-4-

partial motion to dismiss with supporting memoranda, seeking to
dismiss Plaintiffs negligence claims and the Section 1983 cause against
them. Aplt. App. 43-50, 67-74, Doc. 28-29, 47. Plaintiff opposed the
motion. Aplt. App. 51-66, Doc. 36. The district court heard oral
argument, after which Defendants submitted corrected memoranda and
both parties submitted supplemental responses. Aplt. App. 75-90, Doc.
58, 63-64, 68. The district court entered a memorandum decision and
order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim,
but denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the negligence counts. Aplt.
App. 129-138, Doc. 80. Defendants timely appealed that part of the
order addressing Plaintiffs negligence claims. Aplt. App. 139-142, Doc.
83. That matter was fully briefed and the Tenth Circuit held oral
argument. The Tenth Circuit did not issue a final decision, but it
certified a single question of Utah law, which this Court accepted.

Statement of Facts
For purposes of this brief, Defendants accept as true the following
facts alleged in the amended complaint. See Healthcare Servs. Grp. Inc.
v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, f 3, 40 P.3d 591.
-5-

In 2006 and 2007, sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney committed a
series of delinquent acts 1 and was referred to Utah's Third Judicial
District Juvenile Court. Aplt. App. 20, Amd. Compl. f 25. Dillon
appeared before the Honorable Andrew Valdez, who adjudicated Dillon
as delinquent, placed him on probation and committed Dillon to DHS's
legal custody for out-of-home placement. Id., Amd. Compl. f 26. At
Judge Valdez' direction, DHS committed Dillon to DJJS's supervision,
who pursuant to court order, placed Dillon at Journey Ranch, a
wilderness diversion program. Id., Amd. Compl. f 27.
Dillon did not complete that program, but in June 2007, DJJS
removed Dillon from Journey Ranch after he went AWOL on an
overnight trek. Aplt. App. 21, Amd. Compl. f 29. DJJS committed
Dillon to the Salt Lake Valley Detention Center (SLVDC) pending a
court hearing. Id., Amd. Compl. f 30. At a June 22 hearing, Judge
Valdez continued Dillon in DHS's legal custody and ordered that he

1

A delinquent act is an "act which would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if
committed by an adult." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(6).
-6-

remain at the SLVDC for observation and assessment (0 & A). Id.,
Amd. Compl. 1 31.
Following 0 & A, Judge Valdez directed DJJS to transition Dillon
to a community-based placement. Id., Amd. Compl. I 34. DJJS
referred Dillon to co-defendant Quest Youth Services, a private contract
agency, for proctor placement. Aplt. App. 22, Amd. Compl. f 35.
Quest, in turn, placed Dillon in the proctor home of co-defendant Henry
Kafusi, a private contract provider. Id., Compl, f 36.
Judge Valdez approved Dillon to begin home visits on November
16, 2007. Aplt. App. 23, Amd. Compl. <j[ 47. A week later, Dillon's DJJS
caseworker authorized a Thanksgiving home visit from Thursday,
November 22 through Friday, November 23 at 9:00 p.m.. Id., Amd.
Compl. M 49-50.
Dillon did not return from that visit, but went instead to an
apartment rented by Victor Hernandez. Aplt. App. 23, 24, Amd. Compl.
ff 51, 54. While there, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs and
injured himself. Aplt. App. 24, Amd. Compl. f 55. Dillon's friends and
Mr. Hernandez helped him back to the apartment, where they placed
-7-

Dillon on Hernandez' couch. Id., Amd. Compl., f 56. The next day,
believing him to be dead, Hernandez moved Dillon to an outside
stairwell. Id., Amd. Compl. f 57. Paramedics were notified and arrived
at the scene; later, they transported Dillon to a hospital. Id., Amd.
Compl., f 58.
Dillon Whitney died on November 25, 2007, while en route to Salt
Lake Regional Medical Center. Id., Amd. Compl. f 59. Plaintiffs
amended complaint does not state, but subsequent discovery makes
clear that Quest did not notify and that no one from DHS or DJJS knew
Dillon was missing until after he passed away.

Summary of the Argument
The State retains immunity when a plaintiffs injury arises out of,
occurs in connection with, or results from "the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j). This Court has longheld that a person is incarcerated under the Act when he or she is
"under the control of the State," Madsen v. State, 538 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah
-8-

1978), and unable to "be released [from that control] without some kind
of permission." Emery v. State, 438 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971).
Dillon Whitney died while in the State's custody and while under
state control. For nearly a year prior to his death, Dillon had been
committed to the care and custody of the DHS and subject to ongoing
out-of-home placement. From the time the juvenile court first
adjudicated him as a youth offender, until his untimely death, Dillon
Whitney was subject to juvenile court control and his placement was
determined according to that court's direction. Dillon Whitney was not
free to return home or to reside with either parent. And though the
restrictive nature of Dillon's placements varied, he remained under
State control, possessing leave to participate in a home visit only
because Judge Valdez expressly authorized Dillon to do so.
That outcome stands under the scrutiny of Utah's Youth
Corrections Act. But for his own delinquent conduct, Dillon Whitney
was committed to Defendants' custody for out-of-home placement; first
at a wilderness diversion program, next at the SLVDC, and finally in a
community-based proctor home. At each, Dillon's liberty was restrained
-9-

;m<J his conduclcontrolled. Dillon was not free to be leave any
placement, but was subject to a pick up order and further delinquency
proceedings should he leave that placement absent a court order.
Though Dillon Whitney enjoyed more liberty while in proctor care than
he had known at Journey Ranch or the SLVDC, even there, Dillon was
incarcerated in a place of legal confinement such that Defendants are
immune form Plaintiffs negligence suit. This Court should affirm the
certified question.

Argument
Dillon Whitney was Incarcerated in a Place of Legal
Confinement Such that Defendants Retain Sovereign
Immunity From Plaintiffs Negligence Suit.
This ('<<uH consistently acknowledges the necessity of
governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital governmental
services, and it strictly construes statutory wording to preserve that
immunity. See Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorr., 24 P.3d 958, 96z ; tah
2001); see also Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 1 !>S),
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1996); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). Here, a federal
court judge determined that the Utah Legislature waived the State's
sovereign immunity from Plaintiffs suit, because her injury arose not
out of Dillon Whitney's secure confinement, but out of his placement at
a community-based proctor home. That interpretation finds support
neither in the Immunity Act's plain language nor in this Court's prior
decisions. The Court should reject it and affirm the certified question.
A.

Dillon Whitney was Incarcerated in a Place of Legal
Confinement Under a Plain Reading of Utah's
Immunity Act.

When interpreting any statute, the Court looks first to the
statute's plain language, and gives effect to that language unless it is
ambiguous. See Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 952 (Utah
2002). The Court's goal, therefore, "is to give effect to the legislature's
intent and purpose." Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84,
I 9, 173 P.3d 166, 168 (Utah 2007). The Court will not stray from the
statute's plain meaning when it "is unambiguous and there is no
compelling reason to believe that the legislature has misspoken." Moss
v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, X, 175 P.3d 1042,
-11-

KM*, i Utah LWMintinu Lyon u. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616
(Ut.'ihaOOO)).
The Immi
suit

:. :

!•••-;.

.:; .the
/(

*wi

•;.; •

>• State's sovereign immunity from
\ connection with, or results from . .

'rson in any ... place of legal confinement."
T

-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). On its face, the Act applies to

Plaintiffs injury and to shield Defendants from damages causally
connected to Dillon Whitney's death.
The Ai I ilui'ii mil <'\i'in|)t minors, but it applies to "the
incarc^mtion tA'u/iy person." Id. The Act does not carve out an
except ion for stepped-down, or community-based commitments, but it
shields the State from suit when a person is "in any place of legal
confinement." Id. The Act also does not require actual confinement.
Instead, the State is protected from injuries connected to "legal
confinement." M. Because the incarceration exception is plain on its
face, this Court has no reason to resort to extraneous sources to
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aid its statutory interpretation. See Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, f 9;
Moss, 2007 UT 99, f 13.
A juvenile court judge committed Dillon Whitney to the State's
legal custody for out-of-home placement, where he remained. Dillon
death, and thus Plaintiffs injury, arose out of that custody and Dillon's
incarceration in a place of legal confinement. The State retains its
sovereign immunity and Defendants are accordingly immune from suit.
This Court should affirm the certified question.
B.

Dillon Whitney Remained Under State Control and
Could Not Be Released Without Permission and a
Juvenile Court Order.

This Court has long-held that a person need not be imprisoned or
confined to a jail to be incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. For
more than thirty years, the touchstone of incarceration is being "under
the control of the State," Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978),
and unable to "be released without some kind of permission." Emery v.
State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971). The Court has never wavered
from that test.
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hi Kmerx ,( m.tjnnh of I In' ( \«mi first determined that when read
in tolal "the words 'other place of legal confinement' obviously referred
to something w!,lu-r than a 'jail' or 'state prison.'" Id. at 1297. There, the
(. 'on 11 found that the phrase included a plaintiffs placement at the state
hospital, where despite her initial, voluntary admission, she could not
"be released without some kind of permission." Id. The Court stated
We think the legislature had no intention of
waiving sovereign immunity in this case where a
hospital attendant or guard is involved any more
than it did where a nurse in prison or a jailer is
involved, and in logic and sense it seems that to
treat the two differently would reflect a departure
from legislative intent, simply by playing upon
the adjectives 'voluntary' and 'involuntary,' when
it is obvious that there was a 'confinement' at the
time of injury . . . .
Id.
Plaintiff makes the same argument, I hi nigh v\ it h different
semantics. Here, and in pari, I'hinl iff asks l he ( 'ourt lo give undue
weight lo the lerm "sonnr' 1 voi si is "nun^erui e." But whether securely
placed at the Journey Knnch or the SLVDC, or placed in a community-
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based proctor home, "there was a 'confinement' at the time of
[Plaintiffs] injury." Id.
And perhaps more to the point, Justice Ellett stated in his dissent,
that while a hospital meant to treat the mentally ill should not be
considered a place of legal confinement, "such other places as the
Industrial School and detention homes where delinquent minors are
detained" should. Id. at 1298, Ellett, J dissenting (emphasis added).
The legislature's intent being clear, Defendants have retained their
sovereign immunity here.
Five years after Emery, the Court revisited the incarceration
exception in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). There, the
Court upheld a trial court's order dismissing an action brought by the
surviving children of a woman killed by an escaped prisoner. Ruling in
the alternative, the Court observed that even though the assailant was
released from prison each morning, driven to a work release site, and
then picked up each evening for transport back to the prison, he "was
still under the control of the prison authorities so that his conduct
would 'arise out of the incarceration of any person.'" Id.; see also Kirk v.
-15-

State, 7M R:-,il l:>f>.r>, 1257 (Utah 1989) (findingunderEpting, that
escapee who shot ;md killed attorney at the courthouse had either
"totally escaped the control of the prison . . . or he was still under the
control of the prison authorities . . . in which latter instance the prison
is immune from suit.") (emphasis in original). Dillon Whitney
resembles the prison inmate, who, like Dillon, was not under 24-hour
supervision while on work release, but who, like Dillon, remained under
state control and thus incarcerated in a place of legal confinement.
Next, in Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), the Court
examined whether a state prisoner's death arose out of his
incarceration. Eschewing a narrow interpretation of the Immunity Act,
this Court found that "[tjhe plain meaning of the [incarcera
reflects a legislative intent to retain sovereign imn.

ty\

occurring while the person is in prison and u ndcr
State" Id. (emphasis added).
The Court most recently upheld the State
exception in Peck v. State, 200(

' >

Court preserved the State's immunii
-16-

!

•••• •

..::

time Peck fell and was injured, he was neither imprisoned nor in jail.
Id., 2008 UT 39, f 8. The Court determined that a person who had been
"arrested, handcuffed, and told to stand in front of the police cruiser [,
c]leary . . . was 'under the control of the State' and unable to 'be
released without some kind of permission.'" Id. (quoting Madsen, 583
P.3d at 93 and Emery, 483 P.2d at 1297). Under those circumstances,
and despite a lack of actual confinement, the Court determined that
Peck was incarcerated for purposes of the Act, id., and also that Peck's
injury arose out of and was connected to that control. Id. at f 14.
Plaintiff and the district court rejected that authority in prior
proceedings. They relied instead, on dicta and an incomplete reading of
a Utah Court of Appeals decision in Pace v. St. George City Police Dep't,
2006 UT App 494, 153 P.3d 789; see Aplt. App. 134-137, Doc. 80, Memo.
Dec. at pp. 6-9. But read in harmony with this Court's precedents, even
Pace supports Defendants' immunity.
In Pace, the plaintiff sued the St. George Police Department after
her husband killed himself while under arrest and in police custody, but
prior to being booked or placed in jail. Id., 2006 UT App 494, <R6. The
-17-

plaintiff argued Ilia! 11 H • trial rnnrt erred by dismissing her complaint,
< laiming the ('ily was imt immune because her husband was never
"incarcerated." Id. The Court of Appeals observed that "the Immunity
Act docs not define incarceration," and accordingly set out dictionary
definitions of the words "incarcerate" and "confinement." Previously,
Plaintiff rested her contentions on those definitions.
I : .!
c. i
i

Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals also observed in that

lefinitions aside, that this Court had previously "interpreted
.« -;\'J1 luii to mean 'being under the control of the S t a t e , ' . . . or that

a person 'cannot be released without some kind of permission." Id.
(quoting first Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93 and then Emery, 483 P.2d at
1297). Adopting that definition, the Court of Appeals correctly
determined "the record undisputedly shows that at
killed himself, he was under police control and cou.

- ;!.;-.>.

• -\

• :•> •• is* •

without some kind of permission,'
Pace's death occurred 'in
legal confinemen'
plaintiff s sun

- >..
...=•-

•

'place of

. ( •,..-, immune from the

i ami quotation marks omitted).
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Like the decedent in Pace - and the actors in Emery, Epting,
Madsen, and Peck - Dillon Whitney was in the State's legal custody
and under the State's control - Dillon had been adjudicated by the
juvenile court as delinquent and committed by that court to DHS's
custody for appropriate out-of-home placement. See Aplt. App. 20-21,
Amd. Compl. at M 25-27, 30-31, 34. And like those actors, Dillon
Whitney was not free to return home or to be released from DHS's legal
custody "without some kind of permission." Instead, Dillon Whitney's
very ability to return home to visit with his father, required a court
order and express approval from a juvenile court judge. See Aplt. App.
23, Amd. Compl. at f% 47-50. Dillon Whitney was incarcerated when he
fell down a flight of seventeen stairs, and later, when he succumbed to
his injuries. This Court should conclude that the State has retained its
immunity from Plaintiffs suit.
C.

Utah's Youth Corrections Act Supports Defendants'
Sovereign Immunity.

Judge Valdez removed Dillon Whitney from home and committed
him to the State's legal custody because he was a delinquent child, a

-19-

"youili itf'f'endcr .subjrcl lo the

and conditions of Utah Code Ann.

IITUIS

§ W: V ; 1(11 cf ^rq. < West Supp. 2009); see also id. § 78A-6-117 (setting
out ,ill.crnn1iu dispositions). A youth offender is "a person 12 years of
age or older, and who has not reached 21 years of age, committed or
admitted by the juvenile court to the custody, care, and jurisdiction of
[DJJS] for confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the
community, following adjudication for a delinquent act which would
constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult. , ' Id. §
62A-7-10K26) (emphasis added).
Like the Immunity Act - which does not differentiate between
minor and adults, but applies to the incarceration of any person in any
place of legal confinement - the Youth Corrections Act does not
differentiate by degrees of offense, or between the legal chaiuyouth offender's confinement at a "secure facilil
based placement." Id. at § 62A

committed l,o I')< J J S <

i /•

available to a juvenile

.
.\

:<

,

n-n

i\e-

uiicc
emains subject to

DJJS's ongoing supervision, rehabilitation and control.
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In her complaint, Plaintiff emphasized that Dillon had more
liberty while in proctor care than he had known at Journey Ranch or
the SLVDC. But Dillon never possessed the liberty to pack up and
move home:
Youth in the custody or temporary custody of the
division are controlled or detained in a manner
consistent with public safety and rules
promulgated by the division. In the event of an
unauthorized leave from a secure facility,
detention center, community-based program,
receiving center, home, or any other designated
placement, division employees have the authority
and duty to locate and apprehend the youth, or to
initiate action with law enforcement agencies for
assistance.
Id. § 62A-7-104(6).
Though not behind prison bars, DJJS "controlled" Dillon Whitney
"in a manner consistent with public safety." Id. '"Control' means the
authority to detain, restrict, and supervise a youth in a manner
consistent with public safety and the well being of the youth and
division employees." Id. § 62A-7-10K4) (emphasis added).
When the Court steps back, "and look[s] at the entire
incarceration exception," that exception covers Plaintiffs injury here.
-21-

Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 13. A causal link exists between Plaintiffs injury
and Dillon Whitney's commitment to proctor care.
Namely, Dillon Whitney was arrested and referred to a Utah
juvenile court because he committed acts which would have constituted
crimes if he were an adult. Aplt App. 20, Amd. Compl. ff 25-26. That
court adjudicated Dillon as delinquent and committed him to DHS's
legal custody, directing DJJS to assume physical custody of Dillon for
placement first, at a wilderness diversion program; next, at the SLVDC,
and finally, at a community-based, proctor home. Id., Amd. Compl. ff
27, 30, 34. Throughout, Dillon resided in the State's custody and
outside Plaintiffs home. Throughout, Dillon Whitney was under state
control and unable to be released absent the juvenile court's approval.
Thus even under the Youth Corrections Act, the causal link between
Dillon Whitney's incarceration and Plaintiffs injury is apparent. See
e.g., Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 13. Plaintiffs injury arose out of and is
connected with Dillon Whitney's court-ordered placement. The Court
should affirm the question now before it.

-22-

CONCLUSION
A delinquent committed to a community-based proctor home is
subject to state control and cannot be released absent a juvenile court
order. That delinquent, then, is incarcerated in a place of legal
confinement, such that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity
for injuries causally connected to that placement. This Court should
affirm the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' certified question.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 15th day of June, 2011.

BRIDGET* K. ROMANO

(6979)
AssistWt Utah Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS'
BRIEF ON CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

was served by U.S. mail this 15th

day of June, 2011 to the following:

Robert D. Strieper

_X

STRIEPER LAW FIRM
2366 Logan Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight
Facsimile
No Service
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

DONNA WHITNEY and DESTRY
WHITNEY, individually and as parents
and heirs of DILLON WHITNEY,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE SERVICES, a subdivision of
the State of Utah; UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a subdivision of the State of
Utah, STATE OF UTAH; QUEST
YOUTH SERVICES, LLC, a Utah
corporation; KYLE LANCASTER, DAN
MALDONADO, JASON KAUFUSI;
HENRY KAUFUSI; and DOES 1-10,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Case No. 2:09CV30DAK

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Utah, the
Department of Juvenile Justice Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services
(collectively referred to as "the State Defendants"); (2) Plaintiff Donna Whitney and Destry
Whitneys's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court; and (3) Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.1 A hearing was held on August 26,

1

On October 17, 2009, Plaintiff Destry Whitney, Dillon's Whitney's father, filed a
Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing with prejudice his claims against all Defendants. See
Docket #73. The court entered an Order dismissing Mr. Whitney's claims on November 6, 2009.
See Docket #79. Therefore, only Donna Whitney's claims remain against the Defendants,
although the court will refer to "Plaintiffs" throughout this Memorandum Decision and Order.

2009. At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Robert D. Strieper. The State Defendants
were represented by Joni J. Jones, and Defendants Quest Youth Services, Jason Kaufusi, and
Henry Kaufusi were represented by James C. Lewis. The court has carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under
advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. The court
has also considered Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, which was filed on
August 28, 2009, and the State Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum, which was filed on September 8, 2009. Now being fully advised, the court
renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
I. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS2
Sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney was charged with several crimes from late 2006 through
early 2007. As a result of Dillon's delinquent conduct, the Honorable Andrew A. Valdez placed
Dillon on Probation and within the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice
Services ("DJJS") for placement in a wilderness diversion program with Journey Ranch.
On June 5, 2007 Dillon became separated and lost for five hours during an overnight
"trek" with Journey Ranch. Journey Ranch, believing Dillon was an unauthorized leave risk, or
an "AWOL risk," recommended that Dillon be removed from Journey to be placed in a more
"secure facility" where he could be "under surveillance at all times." On June 9, 2007 Dillon was
removed from Journey and placed in custody at the Salt Lake Valley detention center.
On June 22, 2007, Judge Valdez ordered Dillon, who was still in the care and custody of

2

When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, the court is required to accept as true the
allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint. The allegations set forth below are merely allegations and
may or may not be factually accurate.
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DJJS, to be followed by DJJS for observation and assessment, with ultimate plans for DJJS to
arrange a community-based placement. On August 15, 2007, Judge Valdez, based upon the
advice of individuals at DJJS, ordered DJJS to place Dillon in a community-based placement.
On August 15, 2007, DJJS entrusted Jason Kaufusi ("J. Kaufusi") of Quest Youth
Services ("Quest") to place Dillon in a safe and secure proctor home and to track Dillon's
progress. J. Kaufusi placed Dillon at the "proctor home" of his brother, Proctor Henry Kaufusi
("Proctor H. Kaufusi"). According to Plaintiffs, DJJS's employees lost track and control of
Dillon after he was placed in the proctor home. On three separate occasions in early September
2007, a caseworker attempted to contact Dillon, but failed to make contact after being given the
excuse by J. Kaufusi that "it is hard to get hold of him [Dillon] after school."
On September 12, 2007, Dillon had a hearing for a joyriding offense. During this
hearing, a DJJS representative met with and informed Dillon that he would have a new
caseworker "within a month or so." On September 25, 2007 a DJJS representative informed J.
Kaufusi that Dillon would be assigned a new caseworker on October 6, 2007. On October 18,
2007, the new caseworker telephoned J. Kaufusi to introduce himself. On October 30, 2007,
Dillon learned of his new caseworker when J. Kaufusi arranged the meeting and introduced the two.
On November 16, 2007, the new caseworker met with Dillon for a second-and last-time to provide
Dillon with his contact information.
During the November 16, 2007 visit, the caseworker decided that Dillon was ready for home
visitations and motioned the court to approve them. That same day, Judge Valdez approved the
home visits based upon the caseworker's motion. The caseworker informed J. Kaufusi about the
order approving home visits, and the caseworker said he would approve the homevisits as long as
3

Dillon continued to do well in his placement. The caseworker also informed J. Kaufusi that he could
make the determination on home visits as long as J. Kaufusi kept the caseworker updated.
Subsequently, J. Kaufusi approved a home visit for Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 2007, and
Friday, November 23, 2007, until 9:00 P.M.
On Friday, November 23, 2007, Proctor H. Kaufusi twice called his brother, J. Kaufusi, at
Quest to inform him that Dillon had not returned home. J, Kaufusi, who was in St. George, Utah for
the weekend, made one futile attempt to notify Dillon's dad, Destry Whitney, that Dillon was AWOL
and had not returned to the proctor's home. J. Kaufusi also stated that he had left a message on the
caseworker's phone telling him that Dillon was AWOL, having not yet returned to the proctor
home.
On Saturday, November 24, 2007, an AWOL Dillon and some friends were at the
apartment of Victor Hernandez. At some point, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs at
Mr. Hernandez's apartment. Dillon's friends and Mr. Hernandez helped Dillon get back to Mr.
Hernandez's apartment and placed Dillon on a couch. The following day, Mr. Hernandez,
believing Dillon had died, put Dillon out in the stairwell. On Sunday, November 25, 2007,
someone discovered Dillon in the stairwell and called paramedics, who arrived at around 7:00
A.M. Dillon Whitney died en-route to Salt Lake Regional Hospital as a result of blunt force
trauma to his head.
According to Plaintiffs, during the time Dillon was missing, no one from the State of
Utah, DJJS, or Quest searched for him or reported him missing to any authority who could locate
him, as authorized by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Also, Plaintiffs claim that the
proctor home consisted of a basement and upstairs. Proctor H. Kaufusi and his two children
4

lived upstairs while the basement was converted to house the proctored children. Dillon was
placed in the basement of the proctor home with one other proctored child. Allegedly, Proctor
H. Kaufusi allowed the proctored children to come and go at will, and Plaintiffs allege that he
allowed the proctored children to violate their respective court orders, the laws of the State of
Utah, and the policy and procedures of DJJS.
II. THE PENDING MOTIONS
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants on various negligence theories generally
stemming from an alleged breach of their duty to ensure that Dillon was in a secure, controlled
environment, and for civil rights violations under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The State Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims and the negligence
claims against them. Specifically, the State Defendants seek dismissal of the 1983 claims
because the State is not a "person" under § 1983. The State Defendants also seek dismissal of
the negligence claims against them because, they argue, under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, immunity is not waived for negligence if the alleged negligence arises out of one's
incarceration. Therefore, the State Defendants argue, the "incarceration exception" to the general
waiver of immunity for negligence precludes Plaintiffs' negligence claims.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Dillon was not "incarcerated," and, thus, the incarceration
exception does not apply in this case. They also argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the
court finds ambiguity concerning whether the incarceration exception would apply in these
circumstances, the court should certify this question to the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs have
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also filed a Second Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

1. § 1983 Claims
The State Defendants first argue that they are not persons for purposes of Section 1983,
and therefore, the civil rights claims against them must be dismissed. "Neither the state, nor a
governmental entity that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state
official who acts in his or her official capacity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983."
Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995). The court agrees, and Plaintiffs do
not dispute, that the § 1983 claims against the State Defendants must be dismissed.
2.

Negligence Claims

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA").3 Generally, immunity from suit is waived as to any
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) (2008). The question presented by
the instant motion is whether an exception to the waiver of immunity applies. The State
Defendants claim that the "incarceration" exception applies in this case, compelling the dismissal
of the negligence claims against them.
The UGIA retains immunity for negligence claims if the injury "arises out of, in
connection with, or results from . . . incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or
3

There is no dispute that the State Defendants are governmental entities performing
governmental functions.
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city jail, or other place of legal confinement" Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). State
Defendants rely on several Utah cases for the proposition that the incarceration exception applies
in this case, barring the negligence claims against them. In Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 246, 244
(Utah 1976), for example, plaintiffs sued the State when their mother was killed by an inmate
who had escaped from the state prison. The inmate had escaped from a work-release program
when he killed the plaintiffs' mother. The court held that the placing of a prisoner in a work
release program was the exercise of a discretionary function, for which defendants enjoyed
immunity. As to the incarceration exception, the court also observed:
As to the status of [the inmate] vis-a-vis Defendants' prison, there
seems to be just two alternatives, either: (a) he had totally escaped
the control of the prison and was thus acting on his own so the
prison was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under the
control of the prison authorities so that his conduct would "arise
out of the incarceration of any person in (the) state prison . . . " in
which latter instance the prison is immune from suit under the
statute.
Id. at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1989) (applying the incarceration exception to a
situation where a prisoner shot and injured the plaintiff during a court appearance). The court
finds that these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because the both Kirk and Epting
involved individuals who were sentenced to serve time in prison and were therefore
"incarcerated" as that term is commonly understood.
The State Defendants also rely on Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), a case in
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the incarceration exception barred a negligence claim
when the decedent had voluntarily admitted herself to the Utah State Hospital. While this case is
not as easily distinguishable as Kirk and Epting, a close reading of the court's reasoning reveals
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that Emery, too, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Emery, the court analyzed the statute
pertaining to the state hospital and determined that the state hospital was a place of "legal
confinement," even though the decedent had voluntarily requested to be admitted, because a
specific provision in the statute that allowed for the possibility of the decedent being held against
her will. Id. at 1297. Specifically, once a voluntary patient requested to be released, the patient
was required to wait forty-eight hours to permit sufficient time for the superintendent of the
hospital to file a motion with a court to prevent the release. If a court granted such a motion,
there would be no release, and the patient could be confined against his will. Id. The court
determined that a "voluntary" patient was as much confined as was an "involuntary" patient until
certain steps were taken to obtain a release. Id. at 1298. Thus, the court found that the
incarceration exception applied in that case.
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the incarceration exception is inapplicable because
Dillon was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement but was instead placed in a
community-based program. They contend that the situation in this case is more analogous to a
foster-care placement than to being "incarcerated." Then, they argue that Utah courts have
repeatedly recognized valid claims against the State for negligent placement of children in foster
care.
Having reviewed the case law concerning the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity for negligence, the case law on negligence claims against the state
pertaining to foster-care placement, and the statutory language of the Juvenile Justice Services
statute, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the incarceration exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity does not apply in this case.
8

The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to confine."
Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App 494, U 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006).
In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that
youth offenders are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the
community." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). A
"secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the division, that provides
24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody
and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-based program" as defined
by the legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential program designated to
supervise and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public
safety, and designated or operated by or under contract with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3).
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine Dillon to a secure facility
but to place him in a community-based program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated
"in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude
that Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for purposes of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to immunity under
the incarceration exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligence.4
B.

PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS

Plaintiffs have also requested that, if the court does not agree with their position, then the
court should certify the issue to the Utah Supreme Court. This request is moot in light of the
4

Because of the court's determination on this issue, the court need not address Plaintiffs'
arguments based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the UGIA.
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court's determination above.
In addition, Plaintiffs have requested leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, seeking
to add two causes of action: Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Utah State Constitution Article
I Section 7; and (2) they also seek to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party.
The court will permit Plaintiffs to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party and will
also permit Plaintiffs to add their civil rights claim based on the Utah Constitution. The court
finds that the Notice of Claim was sufficient to encompass such a claim.
IV, CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
(1) The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 28] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The claims brought against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 are DISMISSED, but the negligence claims against the State Defendants remain;
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court [Docket #37] is
DENIED AS MOOT; and
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket #44] is
GRANTED.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

^<%'kJLaz
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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